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22 October 1948.

HR70-14....

Copy No.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Yesterday afternoon I was called on by Mr. William Jackson, one of the three members of the so-called "Dulles Survey Group". Mr. Jackson stated that the Group planned to submit its report on 1 December and that they had the data they needed except in the case of our Office of Special Operations. That, in view of the fact that Mr. Allen Dulles was busy as a member of Mr. Dewey's staff, he (Mr. Jackson) and Mr. Robert Blum planned on going into the SO situation in the next few days.

Mr. Jackson stated he and Mr. Blum must both have full access to the functions of SO in order to clean up the job. I said there had never been any objection to this as long as they did not ask to go into "intelligence sources and methods". He said there had obviously been a reluctance to having Mr. Blum go into details. I countered by saying that we had insisted that Mr. Blum clear his desires with the Assistant Director for Special Operations before going into the branches; that since setting up that requirement Mr. Blum had never been around.

Mr. Jackson said it was necessary to go into details of operation since the NSC Directive to the Group had frequently used the word "Survey" when it must have been obvious to everyone that they meant "Investigation".

Mr. Jackson said he would like to start discussing Communication Intelligence with today. I remarked that such a discussion, if it went beyond generalities, would involve certain clearances not within our jurisdiction. Mr. Jackson said he felt his directive from Mr. Souers was sufficient authority for any survey he wished to make. He further stated that he had talked to Colonel Carter Clarke on this subject and that Colonel Clarke was very open and frank in his discussion of Communication Intelligence. (In later telephone conversation with Colonel Clarke, he violently denied he had discussed communication intelligence with Mr. Jackson.)

Mr. Jackson brought up the point that the Eberstadt Survey Report would be much less detailed and exact than the Dulles report. I questioned this on the grounds that:

1. The Eberstadt Survey Group were experienced investigators who thoroughly went through all our activities and who cooperated completely with our security restrictions.

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2. The Eberstadt Committee spent a great deal more time in their survey although accomplished over a shorter time than that utilized by the Dulles Group.

Mr. Jackson "laughed off" the idea that the Eberstadt Report was of any value and said--"I know several things about that."

 Brigadian	General.	TISA

N.B. I have talked to Sovers, Inglis, and Clarke in connection with the above insofor as it pertains to Communication Intelligence.



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Mr. Ruddock, OPC, reference report that it was possible they were bringing to US and suggested that before any positive action was taken, it should be discussed with OSO and DCI.  Mr. Ruddock disclaimed any knowledge of matter.
ID, reference desire by Mr. Wm. Jackson of Dulles Survey Group to investigate Comint. activities.
Dr. Andrews, OCD, reference report which had not been disseminated to FBI thru error; new forms being developed which should prevent future failures.
reference his trip desired to discuss and variou activities with DD.
Mr. Souers, NSC, reference Mr Jackson's request to go into Comint. activities.
Dr. Andrews, OCD, reference request on Army which was called to DD's attention on 21 October. Suggested that Col. Blakeney, ICAPS endeavor to obtain thru contacts in Under Secretary's office. Approved.
OSO, reference article in 14 Oct issue of Intelligence Review (page 56). It was suggested that he call General Bolling, Acting Dir of Intel, GSUSA, to call attention to article.

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TWELFTH ARMY GROUP REUNION -- Luncheon and dinner, etc.